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byINTRODUCTION
t.tle  have  just  emerged  from  the longest, and, by some  measures,  the
severest post-war recessj  on.  It  i  s  not  surpri  s  ing,  therefore,  that
financial-sector  problems have emerged,  In economjc  downturns,  certain
phenomena  typically  occur.  Included  among  lhese  are sharp adjustments in
risk  premiums  and yield-curve configurations, increases  in the number  of
problem  loans  and  loan losses, a rise in the number  of  troubled  financjal
institutions,  and  a higher  failur"e  rate among  financjal institutions.  Thjs
list  in  fact  encompasses  a  good deal  of  the  financial  difficulties
experienced  during the last recessjon, As the wor'ld  economy  continues  its
recovery,  the current volume  of problem  credits wilI  tend to be  worked  off,
lessening the  financial  stress,  Available  evidence  on credit exposul"e
indicates, however,  that,  at least jn the near  term, lhe  fai lure  rate  of
U.S.  banks will  remain above  the avenage  prevailing during the pre-1975
period.  This  suggests that  current  financial-sector  difficulties  may
reflect  structural  as  well as cyc'l  ical  problems,  a prognosi  s that rai  ses
concerns  about  the long-run  strength  and  stabi  I  ity  of  the  U.S.  financial
sysrem.
In  this  paper,  we  hypothesize that  the  incentive  structure
provided by  fi nanci  a'l  safety-net  mechani  sms has  al  tered  the  ri sk
preferences of U.S. financial jnstjtutjons.  This change,  in turn, has led
them  to accept  an excessjve  amount  of rjsk.  In addition, the  prjcing  and
provision  of  deposit  insunance  all  but eljminated  the risk of depositor
I  oss from  bank  faj  I  ure,  llle wi  I  1  argue thal  thi s  a  ltered  the  pri  ci  ng
adjustment mechanism  in the U.S. and  international money  markets. Similar
changes  may  have  occurred  jn other countries, making  financial institutions
in those  countries  more  willing  to undertake  undue  risk.  An examination  ofa
the latter  issue is  beyond  the scope  of this  paper.  We  focus  on  the  U.S.
banking  system. In addition, to further simplify the issue, we  concentrate
on one  safety-net  mechanism,  the  system of  federal  deposit  insurance.
Incentives  provided  by other fjnancial safety-net mechanisms,  including IMF
lending  and  Lhe 
.lender-of-last-resort 
function  of  the  Federal Reserve
System,  also have  jnfluenced  bank  decision  making. In this  paper,  however,
we  only analyze  the interaction of these  other safety-net  mechanisms  with
the  existjng  federal  deposit  insurance system, and  do  not present  a
detailed overview  of these  other mechanisms.l  Fina1ly, no attempt  ls  made
to  quantify  Lhe direct  impact of deposit jnsurance  on ri sk taking.  As
desi  gned,  the safety-net  mechanj  sms  establ  i shed  i  n the U.  S.  were  i  ntended
to  operate  interdependently.  It  is  thus  difficult  to  determine
quantitatively the independent  impact  of each  of these  mechanisms.  Noli  s
any  attempt  made  to measure  the contrjbution of cyclica'l factors to current
difficulties.  Oulintentjon  is to analyze  the impact  of deposit safety-net
mechanisms  on  bank risk  decjsjons.  Our  analysis  concludes that, by
altering the manner  in which  rjsk  is priced, deposit  insurance heightened
current  financial  difficulties  both  by encouraging  U.S. banks  to accept
more  credjt risk and  by reducing  their  ability  to  measure  risk.  Within
this  framework,  the international debt crisis  js but one  of several  severe
financial-sector  difficulties  which  have  already  developed  from
overexDosure  to ri sk.J
AN  OVERVIEW  OF  CURRENT  FINANCIAL  SECTOR  WEAKNESS
0
A variety of financjal-sector problems  has  emerged  during the past
few  years, suggesting  that  the  U-S.  financial  system has  become  more
susceptible to stress.  Two  problems  are especial  ly  note\iorthy: losses in
the thrift  industry  and  the  loan  problems of  key  commercia1  banks.
Weakness  in  lhe  thrift  industry was  brought  on by a prolonged  period of
high and  volatile  interest rates.  This  problem primarily  resulted  from
regulations  requiring  thrifts  to  maintain a  large proportion  of thejr
assets  in long-term  fixed-rate assets.  These  regu'lations  prevented  thrifts
from  adjusting to an jnflatjonary environment. Even  though  recent  changes
in regulations have  expanded  their  asset powers,  thrjfts  still  have  a large
proportion  of their  asset  portfolios  in long-term  fjxed-rate mortgages  and
mortgage-backed  securities.  Another  sharp and  protracted  turnaround in
interest rates would  again  have  serious  consequences  for most  firms in that
i  ndustry.  Despi  te the cycl  i  ca1  character  of thri ft-j ndustry  probl  ems,  they
raise concerns  about  the long-term  viability  of that industry.
In  addition,  more attention  is now  being  gjven  to the new  real
estate I  endj  ng practi  ces of thri fts.  Al  though fi xed-rate  home  morlgage
loans  are vulnerable  to large swings  in  jnterest rates, the credjt risk of
such  loans is  relatively  1ow,  In contrast, much of  the  loan  growth at
thrifts  during the past ttvo  years has  been  in areas  exposed  to high credit
risk,  like  construction  and  I  and-devel  opment  projects.  The  shift  toward
assumptjon  of greater credit risk  has  rajsed concerns  about  the ability  of
thrifts  to  absorb potentially  large  losses  from  exposure  to  both
interest-rate and  credit  risk during any future cyclical downturn.+}
In  their  domestic  portfol  ios,  many commercial  banks have
experienced  severe  earnings  pressures  from  an  increase in  nonperforming
1oans, particularly  energy-related  credjts.  Two  large banks  have  already
failed  primarily in response  to bad  energy  credits:  the United  Penn  Square
Bank in  Oklahoma,  and  the  First National  Bank  of tlidland  in Texas.  In
addition, severe  earnings  pressures  at SeaFirst  National  Bank in  Seattle
necessitated  a maior  regulatory  policy change,  whereby  an out-of-state Bank
Holding Company  (Bank of  America) acquired the  troubled  Uashington
institution.
Though these  domestic  difficulties  have  received  much  attention,
loan problems  in the international area  are at least of  equal  imporlance.
Al  I  of the nation's largest multinationaj banks  are subject  to potential  ly
severe  losses  from  defaults on international loans.  The gains  in  income
reported  by  many of  the natjonrs largest banks  for 1982-83  do not fully
reflect  temporary disruptions  in  jnterest  and  principal  payments  by
international  borrowers  unable or  unwilling  to  meet debt-servicing
requjrements, The  magnitude  of public-sectolinvolvement,  whjch  already
exceeds  any  pnevious  post-depression  intervention, underscores  the severity
of the foreign-debt  problem. Moreover,  many  analysts  predict lhat the debt
burden of  the  major  Latin  American borrowers  i  s sufficiently  large to
generate  recurring debt servicing  problems throughout thjs  century  and
possibly  .into  the  next.  Are  these  loan  problems  merely  the result of
cycl  ical  factors, or have  more  permanent  structura.l  changes  also occurred?
Econometric  evidence  corroborates  the view  that structural changes

















































































































among  commel"cial  banks  jumped  dramatically.  The  series  for  the  post-war
period  is presented  in Figune  1.2  Prior to 1975,  the serjes had  no  trend.
Though  the fajlure  rate  tended to  increase in  cycl  ical  downturns, it
decl  ined again  during recovery.  In 1975  jt  not only increased  mor"e  than in
earlier  post-tvar  cycles, but it  did  not  revert  to  jts  old  level.  A
statisticajly  significant  change jn  the fajlure  rate occurred,  with the
rate appal"ently  moving  to a permanently  higher level  .  Indeed, during  the
three  years from  1979  to 1981,  the annual  rate of bank  failures was  higher
than the faiIure  rates whjch  developed  during the five  cycl  ical  downturns
prior  to the 1975  cycle.  The  failure  rate in 1982  was  more  than double  the
1975  rate, which  had  set a post-Wor'ld  War  II  record level.  In  1983, the
fajlure  rate  rose again.  These  data suggest  that some  factors other than
ordinary cycl  ical  ones  have  been  operating  on the U.5. banking  structure.
THE  INTERNATIONAL  DEBT  PROBLEM
Beginning  in lhe mid-1970s,  and  up through  the international  debt
crisis  in the  summer  of 1982,  the international lending  activity  of U.S.
banks  was  rnarked  by two parallel  developments.  Finst, there  was a  major
expansion  of  the  internatjonal assets  and  ljabilities  of u.S. banks  held
pnimarily  at their  foreign branch  offices.  As indjcated  in Table  1,  total
assets  of  the overseas  branches  of U.S. banks  increased  from  roughly  $152
billion  in 1974  to more  than  9469  billion  by the end  of  7982 (Col  umn 1).




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































jncluded  placement  of funds  with the  U.S.  parent  institution  and  other
re1ated foreign  branches  as wel  I  as wjth nonrelated  banks. Clajms  on the
U.S. parent  bank  and  on other for"eign  branches  of the U.S. parent increased
from  $32  billion  in 1974  to nearly  $153  billion  jn 1982  (Columns  3 & 4),
while claims  on other non-related  foreign banks  increased  from  $60  bilIion
to  near'ly $134 bi  I  I  i  on.  Hence, more than 60 percent  of the growth  i  n
assets  at the foreign branches  of U.S. banks  shown  in Table  I  resulted from
an increase  jn interbank  activity.  Clajms  on non-bank  foreigners  increased
from  $47  billion  in 1974  to more  than $109  billion  by  Decemben  1982, and
exposure to  foreign  public  borrowers jncreased from  $4 bjl lion to $24
billion."
A second  major  development  in the Euromarkets,  which  also began  in
the  mid-1970s  was  the gradual  shift  away  from  corporate  loans  to credits
granted direclly  to  public  borrowers, or  credits  wjth  publ  ic-sector
guarantees,  Pr"ior to  the  1982  credit crisis,  loan-pricing  terms  in the
Eurocredit  markets  indicated  that lenders  viewed credits  extended t0  a
country  or  publ  ic  authority  (or  credits  to  a  borrower  with a public
guarantor)  as lower  rjsks than private sector credits.  Decis.ions  to  price
public  borrowers as  high-qual  ity  credits were  made  despite the fact that
adequate  informatjon  to determine the  credjtworthiness of  many of  the
foreign  borrowers  was  not  available  fSchweizer and Mattle  (1978),
pp.  18-22]  .  The  j  nabj  I  i  ty to make  both i  nterest and  pri  nci  pa1  payments  on
these  public sector credits is  now  a key source  of concern  to U.S. banks.
To  ca  l  cu  l  ate  the  credi  tworthi ness  of  a  soverei  gn  bort"ower
information on  economic,  pol  itical ,  and  socio-economic  conditions  is
required.  AiI  of  the  major  multinatjonal  banks  allocated resources  to9
analyze  country-risk exposure. But lending  decisjons  frequently  were made
without  attention  being  given  to  these  anaiyses.  Among  the Eastern
European  and  developing  countries, in particular,  timely  data  needed  to
calculate the financial status of these  sovereign  borrowers  simply  were  not
available, or  they  were merely rough estjmates of  data  prepared by
government  agencjes of  countlies  involved  in  negotiating  credit terms
[Schweizer and  Mahie (1978),  pp.  18-22].  Data constraints  made it
difficult  for 
'lenders 
to  determine the  validity  of  the country-risk
studies.  The  constrajnts  did not, however,  reduce  a bankrs  need  to measure
jts  underlying exposure to  credit  risk.  The  inattention given to risk
assessment  suggests  that other factors  were  also  at  work  altering  the
decjsion-making  process  at U.S. banks  with respect  to risk taking.
The  international  lending  crisis  is generally  traced back  to the
oi1-price shock  of 7973-74. The  sharp  adjustment  in oil  prices  initial  ly
produced  huge  0PEC  current-account surp  luses  and  huge defj  ci  ts  i  n
non-oi  l-prbducing countries,  especial  ly  among  non-oi  l-pnoducing  LDCs.
Financial  institutions,  including  U.S. banks,  became  intermediaries  in the
financial-adiustment  process. As Rober"t  Weintraub  (1983a,  pp.  4-5)  aptly
ohrased  it:
The match was obvious.  In  the mid-1970s.  banrs
recycl  ed 0PECrs  surpluses to non-0PEC deve  1  op  i  ng
nations.  If  banks had  not  matched  the  new Detro
deposits  to  the  new credit  demands of  non-OPEC
deve'l  oping  nations,  jf  they  had  loaned  the funds  to
other entities  instead, some  of these  othen  entities  or
those  to  whom  the  funds  were  transferred to,  further
down  the line,  would  have  done  the recycling.
By 1978,  the economic  situation began  to change.  0PEC  surpluses
had  almost  disappeared.  While  they developed  again in 1979-80  as a result
of the  Iranian  Revolution, they  all  but  disappeared  again  by  1982.10
Borrowing  demands  by  non-OPEC  developing
wjth the receding  0PEC  surpluses.  And,  the
credit  lines  to these  borrowers  at narrow
liei  ntraub  (1983a,  p. 5)1.
countries  did not ebb,  however,
banks  conti  nued  to  extend n  e\.,r
spreads  over  funding  costs  [cf.
Prior to the 1973  oil  price shock,  U.S. banks  had  not  engaged  in
substantial  direct  lending  to foreign governments  for which  there were  no
thjrd-party guarantees. The  sheer magnitude  of  the  oi  l-price  increase
together  with  strong  preferences among  surplus  countries  to keep  their
funds  in short-term  money-market  instruments  imposed  new demands  on  the
financial  intermediatjon process. The  iure of fee income,  plus initially
attnactive interest-rate spreads,  made  bank  participation in the  recycling
process  appear  profitable.  The  technique  of syndicating  or packaging  loans
facjlitated  aggressive  U.S. bank  lending  of  unprecedented  magnitude  to
forei  gn borrowers.
The  data in Table  2 provide  an overview  of the distribution  of the
foreign debt exposure  of U.S. banks  at the end  of 1982. Certainly not  all
of  this  foreign  debt, not even  all  the LDC  debt, is of doubtful quality.
if,  for  instance,  we look  at continents,  most  Asian  debt  is  general1y of
high  qual  ity  (trouble  in  the  Ph'i  1'l  ipines  notwithstandjng). The  majon
problems  fac'i  ng U.S. banks  have  been concentrated in  their  exposure to
Eastern European  borrowers and  to developing  countrjes in Latin Amel"ica,
the same  areas  where  data constrajnts  made  credit assessments  particularly
difficult.11
TABLE  2
Amounts  0wed  to U.S.  Banks
Borrowers  as of December  1982
(After Adjustments  for Guarantees  and
by Forei  gn
(In $ Billions)
I  ndi  rect Borrowi  ngs)
G-10  Count,ri  es plus Switzerland
Other  Devel  oped  Countries
Eastern Eu  rope
OPEC  Members
Non-0PEC  Devel  opi  ng Countries-
Lati  n American  & Caribbean
Asia
Afri ca
Offshore  Banki  ng Centers
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ral  Fi  nanci  al  Institutions
(F.F.I.E.C.),  Country  Exposure  Lending
Many  of the loans  extended  by U.S. banks  were  used  either directly
or  indirectly  to  support consumptjon.  Credits  were  extended  to support
publ  ic-sector investment  projects, many  of which  have  turned  out not to  be
cost  effective.  Bnazjl in particular is  saddled  with large, unmanageable
state enterpri  ses  that are overmanned.  Whi  I  e some  of Brazi 
'l  I  s  i  nvestments
are promising,  others  appear  to be of dubious  commercial  value.  In effect,
some  pubiic-sector rrinvestment"  would  be  better  labeled  as  consumption.
Borrowing for  these  purposes supported unsustainable  Ieveis of current
consumption  jnstead  of provid'ing  for net jncreases  in  future  consumption.
If  the interest on these  debts  is to be paid, not to mention  the principal,12
real income  and  consumption  in the overburdened  borrowing  nations  must  faiI
for  some  time.
The  problems highl  ighted  here  differ  among  countries.  Where
private borrowers  are involved, problems  differ  within countries.  Despite
jmportant differences  among  countries, almost  al  l of the o"edit problems
are long term in nature.  The  internatjonal debt problem  js not primari  ly a
short-run  liquidity  problem.  As  Robert Weintraub (1983a, p.4n)  has
pointed  out, the short-term  debt  of  non-0PEC  LDCs jn  1982 was almosc
matched by  their  short-term  assets.  There was  a liquidity  aspect  to
countrjesr  debt-servicing difficulties,  but  this  was caused by  the
inability  of  debtors  to  service  medium-  and  long-term obligations.
Economic  recovery  wjll  ease  these  temporary  liquidity  difficulties,  whjch
are  the  part  of  the  prob.lem  attributable  to  recessionary forces.
Nevertheless,  the foreign-debt  situation is  1ike1y  to be with us well  into
the 21st century.  As the medium-term  debt, which  has  been  restructured  and
whose  maturitjes have  been  extended,  becomes  due, liquidity  problems  wi11
recur  for  some  borrowers. It  is this  asDect  of the dilemma  that leads  us
to characterize  jt  as a long-run  concern  for U.S. banks.
We  have  heard  much  of the fact that nations  cannot go  banknupt.
Nothing could  be  further  fnom the  truth.  In fact,  only comparatively
recently  have  governmental obligations  come  to  represent  the
highest-qua1ity debt.  Britain  establ  ished  this  pattern  only  in  the
nineteenth  century.  l,{estern  democnacies  have  general  iy  (but  not  always)
emulated her in the twentjeth  century.  Adam  Smith  (1921,  II:  p.471)  had13
a sounder  view  of sovereign  debt, not only for his time  but for ours:
When  national debts  have  once  been  accumulated  to  a
certain  degree, there  is  scarce,  I believe, a single
instance  of their  having been fairly  and  completely
paid.  The  I  iberation of the publ  ic revenue,  if  it  has
even  been  brought  about  at all,  has  always  been br"ought
about  by  a bankruptcy; sometimes  by an avowed  one, but
always  by a real one, through  frequently  by a  pretended
payment,
Countries make I'pretended  paymentrr  by  infl ati  ng, or, as Smi  th
phrased  it,  by  Iraising  the  denomination  of  the  cojn.rr  Inflationary
finance  can  be  even  Iess desirable than overt bankruptcy,  because  of its
deleterjous effects on society general  ly  [Smith  (1921), II:  p.  472):
A pretended  payment  of this  kjnd, therefore, instead  of
alleviating,  aggravates in  most  cases  the loss of the
cnedjtors  to the public; and  wjthout  any  advantage  to
the  public,  extends the calamity  to a great number  of
othelinnocent peop'l  e  .
Foreign  governments  cannot,  of course,  inflate  away  the real value
of  dol  lar-denomjnated  assets.  These  governments  can, however,  erode  the
value of debLs  contracted  jn their  respective  domestic  currencies.  As  is
'i  ndicated  in Table  3, this  is  stil'l  a common  practice among  Latin Amerjcan
countries.14
Table  3
Percent  Change  in Consumer  Prices
From  12  months  Earl  i  er
Argenti  na
Braz  i  I
Chile
Ecuador
Mex  i  co
Peru
Venezue  l  a
t|/ei  ghted ave  rage
So  u  rfi--ToilA  Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust  Company  of  Nevl
York (  Seplember,tqq?\
0nly  some  of the acceleration  in inflation  rates can  be explained
by the effects of devaluat'ion.  It  appears that  these  governments  are
attempting to  cope  with the burden  of foreign debt by reducing  the burden
of theit"  domestic  debt.  This strategy  lvill  accompl  ish little  in  the  long
run, however,  if  it  destroys  the l,/ealth  of the domestic  creditor class,
Much already  has  been wrjtten on possible  explanations  for why
these  countries  managed  to  become  so  overburdened  with  debt  and  the
expected  impact  that the debt burden  will  have  on the LDCs. In this paper,
however,  we  concentrate  on  why  the  banks were willing  to  extend these
credits under  terms  that did not reflect  their  oh,n  risk exposure. Evidence
that banks  systematically  underestimated  risk  is,  of course,  difficult  to
adduce.  Nonetheless, Edwards  (1983,  pp.  4-5)  found  that rreven  though
international  banks have taken  into  account some of  the  borrowersl
characteristics,  they  have  tended  to over'look  others.  In that sense,  the


























that  the  present o"i  si  s  i  s  parti  al  ly  a  resul  t  of  banks' l  endi  ng
A
practices.rr'  Indeed,  Edwards  (1983,  p.25) found  more  specifically that,  as
late  as  1980 (the  end  point of his data), rrthe  international financial
market  had  not  predi  cted  i n  any  i  mportant  way  the  future  payment
difficuities  faced  by Argentina,  Mexico,  Uraguay,  and  Venezuela.rr  We  Iook
to the jncentive effects of deposit safety-net  mechanisms,  togethef  with
the  impact which  these  mechanisms  have  had  in altering  interbank  pricrng
constraints, as a partial  expianation  for this miscalculatjon.
Deposit Insurance  and Bank  Risk Taking
Federal  deposit insurance  was  authorized  by  the  Banking Act  of
1933 to restore public confidence  jn the U.S. banking  system. The  primary
objective of deposit jnsurance was  to  maintain  financial  stabil  ity  by
forestal  ling  deposit  runs  on commercjal  banks. This \4as  accompiished  by
alIaying depositor  fears of  capital  Ioss  from  bank faiIure.  It  also
satisfjed  a nelated  but secondary  objective of protecting sma11  depositors
from  incurring financial loss due  to bank  failure.5
The  FDIC  was  created  as part of financjal legislation to constrain
risk  taking by banks. Besides  estab'l  ishing deposjt insurance,  the Banking
Act of  1933 prohibited  banks from,  among  other  things,  underwriting
corporate  securitjes,  from  paying  interest  on demand  deposits, or from
paying  interest on savings  and  time deposits  jn excess  of  al  lowed I  imirs.
These  asset  and  liabiljty  constraints, toge!her  with restrjctive  chartering
policies and  limits  to geographic  expansion  imposed  by the McFadden  Act  of
1926, were  intended  to ensure  safe banking  by restraining competition  and
thereby  reducing  incentjves  to undertake  excessive  rjsk.  It  js  difficulti6
to  determine  whether  these  regulatory  constraints, or"  sharply lowered  risk
preferences  resulting from  the dramatic  increase  in  bank fajlures  during
the  Great  Depression,  imposed  effective constraints agajnst excessive  risk
taking  through at  least  the  mid-1960s.  General  ly,  however, banking
historians  view  this  era  as a period  of binding  regulatory  constraints.
The  peniod  from  the mid-1960s  through  1980  was a  period  of  partial ,  de
facto  deregulation.  Inflation  pressured banks into  devising  ways  of
circumventjng  regulatory restrictions,  particularly  those  constraining  the
interest  rate that banks  could pay  to attract  deposits,  At the same  time,
banks  become  more  aggressive  in exploiting  their  existing  asset  powers.
Fo  ll owi  ng  the  passage  of  the  Monetary Control  Act  of  1980  the U.  S.
financial  system  entered  a period of de jure deregulation.
Data  on bank  failures presented  earlier  jn  this  paper  jndjcate
that  changes in the U.S. banking  structure had  already  deve'l  oped  by 1975.
A statistically  significant increase  in bank  failures  emerged  during  the
era of partial,  de facto deregulation. The  ability  to incur mone  rjsk  in a
partial1y dereguiated  envjronment,  coupled  wjth continued  subsidies  to risk
taking  provided by  deposit  safety-net  mechani  sms, contributed  to the
i  ncrease  i  n bank  fai I  ures.
A brief  discussion  of  some  of  the  financial  innovations that
circumvented  remaining  regulatory  constraints  during the era of partial,  de
facto deregulation  helps to develop  a causal  link  between  deposit jnsurance
and  excessive risk  taking.  We certainly do not bel  jeve that financial
jnnovation  per se  generates excessjve risk  taking.  To  the  contrary,
financial  innovation generally  improves capital  fIows,  lhereby  aiding
efficienL resource  al'location.  What  we  do argue  is  that  the  system of!t
deposit  jnsurance in  the  U.S.,  together  with the lender-of-last-resort
function of the Federal  Reserve  System,  altered the  pricing  mechanism  in
the  interbank  market  in a manner  that reduced  constrajnts on ri sk laking.6
Sjnce  this  paper  examines  the international banking  cri sis,  the overview  of
financial  innovation  Dresented  here  concentrates  on  Euromarket
deve  I  oDments.
0n the asset side, the imposition  of capital controls in the 
.late
1950s, together  with domestic  branching  restrictions,  played  an important
role in the  formation  of  the  intricate  networ"k  of  overseas branches
establ  i  shed by  the  major  U.  S. banks  duri  ng the 1970s. These  constrai  nts
together  with  tax  laws,  interest-rate  restrjctions  and  reserve
requirements, were  key  factors behind  the rapid growth  of the Eurodollar
market  and  the expansion  of intennatjonal  lending  by U.S. banks  [Mi11s and
Short (1979)1. 0n the liability  side, inflation  pressures  induced  banks  to
devise  financial  instruments  paying  market  rates of jnterest  jn  order  to
ci  rcumvent  Regulation  Q  ceilings.
Domestic  ceilings  on  interest  rates  on  large certificates  of
deposit  with maturities of 30 days  or  more were  removed  in  two  stages
during  the  cnedit  crunches  of 1970  and  1973. But domestic  jnterest-rate
restrictions  remained  on demand  deposits  and  on time and  savings deposits
of  less  than  $100,000,  as well as on large t.ime  deposits  wjth maturitjes
less than 30 days.  Thjs induced large  multinational  banks to  raise  a
growing proportion  of  their  short-term  funding  needs  in the Euromarkets,
where  interest rates and  deposit maturities are determined  by the interplay
of supply  and  demand  rather than by national rules or regulations.18
The  ability  to rajse funds  at any  maturity, for a price,  sharply
removed  bankers'  concerns  about  obtajning  adequate  funding  sources  to  meet
credit  commitments. As  the  size  and  depth  of  the Eurodol  lar market
increased,  concerns  about  liquidity  constraints  were mitigated  further.
Moreover, by  the mid-1970s,  under  the leadership  of the European  branches
of U.S. banks,  banks introduced the  rol  l-over  credit,  a  variable-rate
instrument that  made long-term loans  subject  to periodic interest-rate
adjustments. The  interest  rates  on  these  variable  rate  loans  moved
di  rectly  wi  th  market  j  nterest  rates  i  n  the  Eurodol  I  ar  market.  The
rol  l-over credit  became  the  primary  source of  business financing  by
commercial  banks  in the Eut  omarkets.
Prior  to  the  mid-1970s, international  borrowers had  relied
pnimarily on capital  markets to  satisfy  their  medium  and  longer-term
borrowing requjrements.  Variable-rate  pricjng technjques,  together  with
the development  of the loan syndication  process, provided the  basis  for
active  bank participation in financing  medium-  and  long-term  credits.  By
directly  linking interest rates on assets  and  liabiljtjes  wjth  different
maturity  structures,  the  development  of  the  rol  l-over  credit  sharply
reduced  bankers'  concerns  about  exposure  to interest-rate rjsk,  Belief  in
the  safety  of  l  endi  ng  to  soverei  gn  borrowers convi  nced bankers  that
exposure  to credit  risk  from sovereign  borrowers  was  minimal  .
The  London  Intenbank  Offened  Rate  (LIBOR)  provided  the  undenlying
rate  of  interest  on  roll-over  Eurocnedits, LIB0R  is the rate at which
three- or six-month  money  is offered by the leading London  banks to  other
banks.  The  actual  borrowing rate  on  the  credits  exceeds  LIBOR  by a
specified margin  or spread. These  spneads  are  determined by  competitive
pressures  among  partic'ipating  banks.19
The decision  to  particjpate  in  large  Euro-syndicated  credjts
depends  critically  on the assumption  that an adequate  interest-rate  margin
be preserved  on each  credit throughout  the term  establi  shed  for the credit.
The  average  cost of funds  paid by  the  reference banks jn  a  syndicated
credit  determines the base  borrowing  rate.  The  margin  or spread  over the
base  rate reflects the lendersr  assessments  of the borrowerrs  credit  risk.
In  determining whether to  participate in a syndicated  credit,  each  bank
must  judge  whelher  the establ  ished  margin adequately covers the  credit
risk.  In  addition,  to  preserve its  margin on  the  cnedit,  each
particjpating bank  must  be able to contjnue  to bid for funds  throughout  the
term  of  the  credit  at a rate comparable  to the average  rate paid by the
reference  banks.  Over  time bankers  gained  confidence  that,  at each  nollover
date,  they  would be  able to obtain adequate  funding  at an jnterest nate
that would  preserve  the margin  establ  ished  on  a  credit.  This  jncreased
confidence was  a  key  motivating  factor behjnd  the sharp  increase  in the
volume  of syndicated  loan commitments  made  in the  internatjonal  arena by
banks of  varjous  sizes  and  origins.  Competitive  pressures  frequently
reduced  spreads  over  funding  costs  to  as  low  as  three  eights  of  a
percentage  point on major  syndicated  credits.  Such  spreads  would  result in
negative  margins  if  differential  pricing  adjustments  on  deposits  of  as
little  as  one-half  of  a  percentage  point developed  among  partjcipating
banks. Although  risk premiums  of such  magnitudes  are  not  uncommon  among
non-bank  borrowers  with different  risk  characteristics. such  differentials
have  been  rare in the inlerbank  market.
Under  normal  conditjons, the major  U.S. banks  have been able  to
raise funds  at roughly  uniform  rates in both the domestic  and  international20
money  markets.  Moreover,  rate  d  ifferenti al  s  between  the  l  arge
multinational  banks and  the major  regionals  have  been  as smal  I as between
one-eighth  to one-quarter  of a percentage  point.  This has  enabled  banks  jn
different  size  classjfications  to  participate  in  the  same credits.
Djfferentjal  pricing adjustments  on bank  deposits  do occur, but significant
adjustments  only develop  after problems  of cri sis proportions  have  emerged.
In other words,  pricing adjustments  in the interbank  market tend  to  take
place  in an ex post rather than jn the ex ante  fashjon that characterizes
other fi nanci  al markets.
During  periods  of  financial  crisis,  when the  probabi  lity  of
financial  fai lure due  to excessive  exposure  to risk  is  sharply  heightened,
'interest-rat,e  differenlial s on bank  deposits  widen.  Banks  deemed  to  have
higher  exposure  to risk pay  more  for funds  and, in some  jnstances,  deposit
outflows  from  those  banks  have caused I  iquidity  problems.  It  must  be
underscored, however, that the emergence  of sharply  graduated  or "tiered"
'i  nterest-rate structures  are  an  unusual devel  opment i  n  the  interbanr
market.  Duri  ng  the  past  decade, l  arge  i  nterest-rate  dj  fferenti al  s
developed after  the  Herstatt  Bank failure  in  the  summer  of  1,974.
Similarly,  concerns about  excessive exposure to  probiem credits have
created  funding  problems  at several  U.S. banks  during the latest  period  of
financjal  stress.  These  cases  of jnterest-rate tiering  occurred,  however,
after a problem  of crisis  proportions  had  been  clearly identified.
The  development  of unquestioned  confidence  among  depositors  in the
abi  l  i  ty  of  f inanci  al  -sector  safety-net  mechan  isms  to prevent  unexpected
iosses  from  bank  failure  appears  to  have played a  significant  role  in
altering  pnicing  in the interbank  market.  Specifically, the existence  of2I
deposit insurance,  and  the manner  in which  the existing  deposit  jnsurance
system  operates,  eiiminates  incentives  for  depositors  to  require
risk-related premiums  on bank  deposits  until  informatjon  surfaces that  a
bank  js  in  serious  danger  of failing.  Accordingiy,  when  choosing  on the
margin  between  risk and  reward,  banks  do not face incremental  funding  costs
that reflect  the additional risk  incurred.  When  placing funds  in a bank,  a
depositor should  be concerned  with the risk-return combination  relative  to
jnvestment alternatjves  (bank  and  non-bank). The  safety-net  mechanisms
provided  for banks  have,  however, a1tered this  decjsjon-makjng  process.
Depositors believe that the probability of financial loss fnom  the failure
of large banking  institutions  is almost  njl.  This has  removed  an important
day-to-day  constraint on risk taking by banks.
Within  the  current  framework,  domestic  deposjts  at FDIC-insured
banks  are 1ega1ly  proLected  up  to $100,000. To provide  this  coverage, the
FDIC charges a  fixed-rate  premium  of one-twelfth of one  percent  of a1l
domestic  deposits  at each  insured institutjon.  Legally,  then,  domestic
deposits  held in excess  of $100,000  at a single instjtutjon  are not covered
by FDIC  insurance,  nor are the deposits  he.ld  at  the  forejgn  branches of
U.S.  banks.  In practjce, however,  the manner  in which  bank  fai lures have
been  settled by the FDIC  has  provided  de facto 10O-percent  coverage  to  all
domestic depositors.  0ver time, uninsured  depositors  became  increasingly
confident  that  existing  deposit  safety-net  mechanisms,  including  the
avai  l  abi  1  i  ty  of  dj  scount-wi  ndow borrowi  ng  for  banks faci  ng  fundi  ng
constraints, would  provide  adequate  time for them to  remove  their  funds
from  troubled  instjtutions  before  incurring  financial  loss.  Thjs
perception also  reduced concerns about  the  financial  exposure  of
Eurocurrency  deposjtors.22
The deposits  of  the  foreign  branches of  U.S.  banks  are not
FDIC-insured,  and  the U.S. parent  bank  is  not legally bound  to cover  losses
incurred  by  the  depositors  of its  foreign branches. By  the late  1970's,
risk premiums  between  the domestic  and  Eurocurrency  deposits  of U.S,  banks
virtual ly  disappeared.  Interest-rate  differentials  consistent  wjth the
exi  stence  of ri sk  premi  ums aga  in  emerged  after  the  i982  debt  cri si  s
surfaced [Cf. Kreicher  (1982)].  Again, however,  it  is only after problems
of major  proportions  emerge  that significant risk premiums  are required  by
un  in  sured  bank  depositors.7
The  belief  among  depositors,  including large uninsured  depositors,
that the probability of financial loss from  bank  failure  is minimal,  delays
the  timing of jnterest-rate adjustments  and  dampens  the magnitude  of these
adjustments  that would  normally  occur  in  money  markets.  Similarly,  the
interplay  between  the  system  of  deposit  jnsurance  and  the
lender-of-last-resort function has  shanply  reduced  bankers'  concerns about
their  abjlity  to obtain adequate  funding  at profitable interest rates.  In
the event  that deposit outflows  from  a bank generate l  iquidity  problems,
the  constrajned bank  is able to meet  its  fund'ing  commitments  by borrowing
from  the Federal Reserver  s  di  scount wi  ndow.  The  net  resul  t  of  thi  s
process,  which  has  evolved over  time,  is  that  day-to-day pricing
adjustments  in the  domestic and  international  money  narkets  have not
imposed  adequate constraints on bank  risk taking.  By  reducing  the market
di  scipl  ine that would  normaljy  be imposed  by different'iai pricing  on  bank
deposi  ts,  these  safety-net  mechan'i  sms reduce the margi  na1  cost of ri sk
taking.  Thjs enables  the banks  to undertake  more  risk.23
The  cost reductjon  is  only  temporary.  As  long  as  financial
institutions  are  subject  to  losses  from  their  exposure to rj sk, the
magnitude  of t.his risk exposure  wilI  be revealed.  The  opportunity  cost  of
assuming  excessive risk  is  revealed  when  borrowers  are no longer  able to
senvice  their debts,  Fjnancial  instjtutjons  manage  their  operations to
maximize  the  expected  value of thejr  charter.  |t,lith  inappropriate  prjctng
signals, however,  the ability  to measure  the risk  jncurred  js  dimjnished.
This djminished  ability  to measure  risk  reinforces  the incentive  effects of
safety-net mechanisms  to incur more  risk.
Since  the FDIC  began  operations,  most bank failures  and,  untjl
Penn Square, all  large  bank failures, were  settled with a purchase  and
assumpti  on (  P&A)  transacti  on. In a P&A  transaction. the FDIC  transfers all
the  Iiabjlities  of  a  fajled  bank  to the assuming  (acquiring) bank.  If
accompl  ished  overnight,  a  P&A transactjon  avoids  any  interruption  in
avai  lability  of  funds  to a domestic  depositor.  Depositors  were  paid off
only in the case  of some smalIer  fai led  institutions.  0nly  then  were
depositors  with accounts  in excess  of $100,000  at risk.8
By leav'ing  large depositors  partially  at ri sk, the FDICTs  handling
of the Penn  Square fai I  ure  i  ntroduced some uncertai  nty  i  nto  fi nanci  a  l
markets,  For  a  time,  however, it  appeared  that this  case  might  be an
anomaly. Penn  Square  presented  a special problem to  an  acquir.ing banr,
since  it  would confront  potentially  major  litigation  over past loans.
Moreover,  when  F'i  rst  National  Bank  of l'lidland  failed with over  g1  billion
in  assets,  the  FDIC  reverted  to its  P&A  policy.  More  recently, however,
the FDIC  has  been  settling  failed banks  by paying  off  insured depos.itors
fu11y,  but  offening  only  partial  payment  on  amounts  over g100,000  on24
deposit. In several  recent  cases,  the  FDIC  has  paid  between  40%  and  60%  of
the  face  amount to lal"ge  depositors.  If  proceeds  from  jts  sales  of bank
assets  exceeds expectatjons, then  the  FDIC wil  I  increase the  amount
remitted to these large uninsured  depositors, in accordance  with the actual
asset value.  If  the proceeds  fal'l  short of  expectations, then  the  FDIC
absorbs the  losses.  Since  the failure  of Fjrst National  Bank  of Midland,
none  of the recent faiIures involved  large banks. Only  time wiII  telI  if
the  FDiC wil l  apply  this  new policy  of  partial  payment  to uninsured
depositors  to large bank  fai lures.  Such  a change  would  have far  reaching
consequences. For  the  purpose  of this  paper,  which  analyzes  reasons  for
banksr  overexposure  to credit risk  on foreign 1oans,  the policy of de facto
100%  deposit  jnsurance  was  the norm,  Limited  concenn  by large depositors
about  the potential of financial  loss  from  bank failure  reduced their
incentjves  to  monitor  bank risk  decisjons  on a day-to-day  basis.  As a
result,  relevant price signal  s about  the  risk  preferences of  depositors
were  not being  sent to banks, This applied  to the international as well as
to the U.S. money  (deposit) manket.
in sharp  contrast to other financial  markets, the  bank deposit
market reacts  after  the fact to events  that have  altered the risk/return
situation facing bank  decjsjon  makers. lnstead  of rjsk  being  contjnually
repriced  to  the  accompaniment  of deposit flows at the margin,  there is a
comparatively  sudden  and  massive  movement  of uninsured  funds  from  banks at
which  the probability of failune is high.  By  diminishing  the incentives  of
depositors  to monitor  the performance  of the banks  in wh'ich they  maintain
their  funds,  deposit  safety-net  mechani  sms,  includjng  deposit insurance,
have  encouraged  banks  to assume  more  risk than they  olherwise would have?5
assumed.  In so  doing, banks  generate  a negative  externa'l  ity,  one  known  in
the economics  literature  as 'rmoral  hazardrr.
The  mora  l  hazard  probl  em  i s  not  a  necessary oulcome of  the
provision of deposit insurance,  but is generated  by the manner  in v'rhich  the
deposit  insurance is  priced  and  provided.  By  relying  on  the  P&A
transaction  to  settle  fajled  banks,  and  by charging  a fixed-rate premium
for  coverage without  regard  to  the  ri sk  exposure of  the  covered
institution,  the  existing  system of  deposit  insurance contrjbutes  to
current difficultjes.  Short  and  0rDrjscoll (1983)  have  addressed  the issue
of deposit-insurance  reform,  and  presented  a transition  proposal  for moving
tolvard  a system  of private deposit insurance. By removing  the subsidies  to
risk  takjng currently provided  by deposit insurance,  this  reform  would  also
begin  to address  the diffjculties  resulting from  previous overexposure  to
credit ri sk in the international arena.A Transition Proposal  for  Competitive  Deposit  Insurancev
The  specifics  of  our  transition  proposal to  a  system of
competitiVe deposit  insurance are  pr"esented  in  this  section.  our
commitment  is  to the goal of competjtive  pricing of deposit insurance,  not
to the specific transitjon  proposal presented here.  Nonetheless, thjs
proposal has  the  advantage  of  not  interrupting  the present  system  of
deposit insurance. The  FDIC would continue to  provide  basic  deposjt
jnsurance while  private  capital  is attracted to the industry.  0nce  the
transition  is  completed, the  FDIC would continue  supplying  deposit
'insurance  as one  among  a number"  of competitors.
To  reach  a  system of private deposit insurance,  we  suggest  the
following four policy changed  be made:
1. Eliminate  de facto coverage  of deposits  above statutory
limits,  rEZii6Joverage  limits  ind introduce  some  form
of coinsurance;
EI  iminate  the  statutory  requirement that  national  ly
chartered and  state-chartered  member  banks,  as well as
banks  associated  njth  bank holding  companies  purchase
deposit insurance  from  the FDIC;
Impose  a  requi  nement  that  the  FDIC  uti I  ize the best
available information  to determjne  risk  categories;  and
that  these  rjsk classjfications be used  to set premiums
that minimize  cross-subsidization  among  risk categories;
Impose  a requjrement  that the FDIC  cover  costs plus earn
a reasonable  return on caoital.
2.
+.
The  fi rst  recommendati  on,
needed  to attract  private firms to
which  js perhaps  the most  important,  is
the  deposit-insurance  bus  iness.  The
percent  coverage  to all  depositors  has pol  icy  of  providing  de facto  10027
lessened  market  discipline on banks by  minimizing depositorsr  fears  of
loss.  It  has  al  so  effectively  precluded a  market  for excess  deposit
'insurance  coverage  over and  above  the limits  of  the  basic  policy.  The
market  for excess  coverage  is the most  like1y place for private competitors
to enter.  The  scope  for competitive  entry wouid  be increased by  lowering
deposit  I  jmits.  In offering excess  coverage,  private insurers  would  price
insurance  to reflect  expected  losses.  In this  manner,  risk would  be priced
on the margin.  In addjtion to lolvering  maximum  coverage  limits,  basic FDIC
coverage  should  also be altered to include some  form  of .oinru"an.".10  For
example,  coverage  could  be reduced  to 80 percent  of  losses.  This too would
reduce  moral  hazard  by encouraging  risk  to be priced more  accurately  at the
ma  rg  in.
After  substantial  experience  with excess  coverage,  some  companies
might  choose  to compete  r,,/i  th  the  FDIC in  providing  mjnjmum  or  basic
insurance for  depositors.  The  second  policy recommendatjon  would  have  to
be adopted  to open  the market  for basic insurance  coverage. ldhile  private
deposit  jnsurance is not pnohibited  by any  federal or state statute, most
banks  are required  to purchase  FDIC  insurance.  If  broad-based  coverage by
prjvate  jnsurers  is  desired,  this  requirement  would  have  to be lifted.
When  coupled  with the FDICTs  de facto provision  of  lO0-percent coverage,
thjs  requirement leaves banks with  little  reason to be interested jn
prj  vate i  nsurance.
The  th'i  rd recommendatjon  is motivated  by the FDIC's  reluctance to
use  available  information gained in  the examination  process  in setting
insurance  premiums.  Some  of  the  FDICTs  concerns in  thi s  regard are
meritorious. but robusL  information  about  risk  characteni  stics is  needed  to28
prjce ri sk accurately. As  Short  and  0rDriscoll  (1983, pp.18-20),  argue,
better  information  on  risks is needed  to reduce  cross-subsidization  across
di  fferent ri sk c  I  a  s  s  i  f  i  c  a  t  i  o  n  s  .  1  1
The  fourth recommendation  is  intended  to make  comoetition  feasible
for  both  basic  and  excess  deposit-insurance  coverage. The  experience  of
public utility  regulation suggests  that determinjng  what  js a  "normal" or
rrnecessary'r  return on capjtal presents  severe  problems. Nevertheless,  some
thought  must  be given to the rate of  return  required  on  FDIC jnsurance
operations.  If  lhe rate of return js set too low, the FDICTs  pricing would
preclude  entry.  If  the rate of retur"n  is  set too high,  the  FDICTs  rates
would  act as an rrumbrel  larr  protect'i  ng private competitors.
The  suggested  changes  could  be implemented  by using  the current
system  of of pricing check-clearing  services  as a transition model  .  In the
Monetary Control  Act  of 1980,  Congress  mandated  that the Federal  Reserve
System  price its  servjces,  including  check clearing,  wjth  the  aim  of
promoting competition with private fir"ms.  Federal  Reserve  Banks  have  had
to identify  costs directly  attrjbutable to clearing checks. And they  are
required  to earn  a reasonable  rate of return on jmputed  capital.  As Frodin
(1984)  demonstrated,  vigorous  competitjon  has  developed  in the area.
Our  proposa  l  goes further  than  the  FDIC'  s  own program  i  n
implementing  the  goal  of  pricing risk.  The  FDIC  is concerned  about  the
inequities and  misal'locations  that  can  be  generated by  inappropriately
pricing  risk.  Their proposal  does  not, however,  adequately  address  these
problems. Without  a profit-and-loss test,  all  that can  be  determined  js  if
rjsk  has  been severeiy  underpriced. And  thjs  can  only be revealed  after
the fact and  at great cost.  If  there  j  s  an  institutional  bias,  it  istoward underpricing
system  of competiti  ve
at
ri sk.  For  this reason
deposit  jnsurance  be
and  others, we  l"ecommend  that a
i  mpl  emented.
Conclusion
Our  main  focus  has  been  to explajn  how the  incentive  structure
provided by  financjal  safety-net  mechanjsms  contributed  to the world-debt
crisjs.  |rlhile  we  presented  some  brief  evidence  on the  dimensions  of  the
problem, we  were  interested  not  jn  demonstra!jng  its  sevet"ity  but jn
analyzing  its  causes. We  are by no  means  suggestjng  that there is a unique
cause,  or  that  any  one  policy action or set of actions  would  preclude  a
sjmjlar crisis  from  occurring  the the future.  We  believe,  however, that
fj nanci  al  safety-net  mechani  sms pl  ayed an important  rol  e i  n the present
crisis.  In par"ticular,  the present  system  of  deposit  insurance provided
institutions  with  strong  jncentives  to undertake  undue  risk.  In a system
of binding  regulation, these  incentives  can  be  offset.  As  deregulation
proceeds, banks  are increasingly  able to respond  to these  jncentives,  The
world-debt  prob'lem,  along  with problems  from  energy-related  credits and  the
excess  exposure  of thrifts  to interest-rate risk,  are, in part,  reflections
of the incentive effects of publ  ic pol  icy.  If  deposit insurance  reform  i  s
not  implemented,  we  can  only speculate  on  what  pnoblem  areas  wjll  be added





a detailed  history  of the lender-of-last-resort  function,  see
Kel  eher  (  1984).
2D"tu  u"" avajlable upon  requesE.
"1t  is  certainly  not  the  increased interbank  actjvity  in
Eurocurrency  markets per  se  that  generated the  world-debt  cri si  s.
Nonetheless, as  we  argue below,  the current level of exposure  to credit
ri sk  refl ects  reduced concerns about  fundi  ng  constrai  nts,  For  the
individual  bank,  an  expanded  pool  of  funds  available in Eurocurnency
markets  contributed  to the reduction  in concerns  over funding  constrajnts.
For  the  source of  those  funds,  see  the section in the text on Deposit
Insurance  and  Bank  Risk  Taking.
'Edwards  gives more  scope  than  \{e  would  to the role  of  exogenous
shocks.  He  nonetheless notes  that:  "Even  though  these  external factors
indeed  have  had  a role jn the  present  crisis,  it  is  important not  to
minimize the  role  of domestic  policies.  In particular,  the fact that jn
most  cases  a large proportion  of the new  indebtedness  was  used to  finance
consumption  should  be pointed  o  ut  .  .  .  rr  I  Edwa  rd  s (1983), pp. 25-27).
R -As  Kareken (1983,  p. 199)  observes,  current FDIC  policies make
l  ittle  sense if  protection  of  the  smal  l  depositor  were  the  primary
objective  of deposit insurance.  If,  however,  prevention  of bank  runs  were
the primary  objective, then current policies make  a great deal of sense.
-The  current system  of pricing deposit  insurance transforms the
role of the lender  of last resort.  By failing  to price risk on the margin,
FDIC  insurance  enables  banks  to underlake  more risk.  Banks that  become
overexposed  to  risk  may be forced  to rely on the dj  scount  windot/  at the
Federal  Reserve  to meet  funding  requirements.  In  turn,  the  abi  lity  to
borrow from  the  discount  window mitigates constraints that banks  would
otherwise  fall  from  large deposit  outflows.  Thus  the FDIC's  pricing policy
is  a necessary  condition for reducing  constraints  on rjsk taking, and  this
policy,  together  with current lender-of-last-resort poljcies,  are  together
the  sufficient  conditions  for a reduction  in  constraints  on rjsk takjng.
In this  sense,  the current system  of deposit insurance  adds  to rather  than
relieves pressure  on the lender  of last  resort.




ti eri  ng agai  n
Since  the FDIC  began  operations,  some  portion of
failed bank  situations have  been  handled  in ways
that have  provided  de facto 100  percent  insurance
coverage  to all  depositors  and  general
creditors....  Especially  in large banks,  there
probably  is  the perception  among  depositors  of
minjmal  ni  sk of 1oss,  and  therefore there are few
the  mid 1970s  there was  substantial interest rate tiering  in
market  following  the  major  Heistatt  Bank fai lure.  Rate
emerged  during the internatjonal banking  crisis  in the summer31
of 1982. In the recent  period,  however,  rate  different'ials  were less  and
persisted for a shorter  period  of time  among  the major  money  center  banks.
Thi  s aga  in suggests  that  the  market uses the  ri sk  of  I  oss to  l  arge
depositors  (resulting  from bankrs overexposure  to  foreign debt)  as
negligible.
o 'Thi  s section  draws  heavily from  Short  and  0'Driscoll  (1983).
1n '-Because  of the growing  jmportance  of money  brokers,  it  is  not
sufficien!  to lower  coverage. As Short  and  0rDriscoll (1983,  p. 18) note,
these  brokers  can  economically  bundle accounts as  low  as  $1,000 into
$100,000 lots,  thus  earning both  higher  interest  and  FDIC  insurance
Drotection.
1l "Cross-subsidjzation  occurs  if  insurance  premiums  do  not  fully
compensate  the insurer for  losses  jncurred  within a giVen  risk category.3Z
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